Modern Monetary Theory (MMT)

John Maynard Keynes, in a 1942 BBC address:

   Let us not submit to the vile doctrine of the nineteenth century that every enterprise must justify itself in pounds, shillings and pence of cash income … Why should we not add in every substantial city the dignity of an ancient university or a European capital … an ample theater, a concert hall, a dance hall, a gallery, cafes, and so forth. Assuredly we can afford this and so much more. Anything we can actually do, we can afford. … We are immeasurably richer than our predecessors. Is it not evident that some sophistry, some fallacy, governs our collective action if we are forced to be so much meaner than they in the embellishments of life? …

   Yet these must be only the trimmings on the more solid, urgent and necessary outgoings on housing the people, on reconstructing industry and transport and on replanning the environment of our daily life. Not only shall we come to possess these excellent things. With a big programme carried out at a regulated pace we can hope to keep employment good for many years to come. We shall, in fact, have built our New Jerusalem out of the labour which in our former vain folly we were keeping unused and unhappy in enforced idleness.

This paper constitutes a first detailed institutional analysis of the UK Government’s expenditure, revenue collection and debt issuance processes. We find, first, that the UK Government creates new money and purchasing power when it undertakes expenditure, rather than spending being financed by taxation from, or debt issuance to, the private sector. The spending process is initiated by the government drawing on a sovereign line of credit from the core legal and accounting structure known as the Consolidated Fund (CF). Under directions from the UK finance ministry, the Bank of England debits the CF’s account at the Bank and credits other accounts at the Bank held by government entities; a practice mandated in law. This creates new public deposits which are used to settle spending by government departments into the economy via the commercial banking sector. Parliament, rather than the Treasury or central bank, is the sole authority under which expenditures from the Consolidated Fund arise. Revenue collection, including taxation, involves the reverse process, crediting the CF’s account at the Bank. With regard to debt issuance, under the current conditions of excess reserve liquidity, the function of debt issuance is best understood as a way of providing safe assets and a reliable source of collateral to the non-bank private sector, insofar as these are not withdrawn by the state via quantitative easing by the Bank of England. The findings support neo-chartalist accounts of the workings of sovereign currency-issuing nations and provide additional institutional detail regarding the apex of the monetary hierarchy in the UK case. The findings also suggest recent debates in the UK around monetary financing and central bank independence need to be reconsidered given the central role of the Consolidated Fund.

A nice little restatement of some basic facts:

I often hear progressives say that Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is all very well, but given the real politic, within which these debates are contested, it is better to rely on mainstream understandings to make the case for more government spending on progressive goals.

I remind these economists of the way that John Maynard Keynes used the (erroneous) neoclassical concept of marginal productivity theory for labour demand in The General Theory, to allow him to concentrate on the supply side, where he believed the differences between his approach and the orthodoxy could best be highlighted.

It was a decision that he regretted when it became obvious that the orthodoxy manipulated the debate to categorise Keynes’ quibbles as the special rather than the general case.

And the result was the neoclassical synthesis which dominated macroeconomics for the next several decades and allowed Monetarism an easier path and then the current New Keynesian paradigm to emerge.

The essential message of Keynes was quickly lost because he made that sort of strategic error – using neoclassical framing.

This is a brilliant explainer. Here's the punchline:

Industrial policy was once central to the rise of today’s wealthiest nations. Yet, after achieving their own development, many downplayed the state’s role, promoting free-market rules abroad. The climate crisis forces a re-evaluation of that legacy. China offers a striking example of what strategic planning can achieve. Long before emerging as a global leader in green technologies, it used industrial policy to build manufacturing capacity, infrastructure and innovation. Through the coordinated efforts of state-owned enterprises, long-term planning, public procurement and technology transfer, China now leads global production of solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles. These interventions have helped drive down global costs, making renewables more accessible and helping to accelerate the energy transition worldwide.

This kind of coordination cannot be replicated by merely relying on market inducements like carbon pricing. When climate action is framed primarily as a problem of mobilising finance, the role of the state is reduced to simply enabling private investment rather than leading the transformation. Public institutions are cast not as planners or investors but as guarantors, tasked with making green investments more attractive to private actors. Tools like blended finance and public-private partnerships are promoted as solutions, but their logic reinforces the idea that structural change must be routed through private investors’ incentives. In practice, this limits the scope of public ambition and steers policy toward projects with clear financial returns rather than broader social or ecological value.

Market mechanisms may help reduce emissions at the margins, and may generate some revenue, but they are not designed to coordinate across sectors, manage trade-offs, or drive large-scale transitions. Treating finance as the central constraint sidelines the essential questions of what gets built, by whom and in whose interest. The belief that markets alone can deliver the necessary scale and direction has not only delayed progress but also distorted priorities—placing finance at the centre while allowing questions of production, capacity, and coordination to fade into the background.

As the United States retreats from managing the international order, returning under Trump to a more transactional and coercive approach to foreign policy—ditching the Paris Agreement, undermining multilateralism, and waging tariff wars under the banner of economic nationalism—it also exposes the fragility of the existing system. The version of globalization built on US financial dominance, free capital flows and market liberalization is beginning to crack under the weight of its own contradictions.

If this chaos has an upside, it is that it presents an opportunity to build an alternative—and radically more just—financial architecture, and to confront the economic orthodoxies that needlessly constrain what is considered possible.

In this paper we provide an in-depth analysis of Pakistan’s macroeconomic situation.
We argue that although the stabilisation program signed with the IMF in November 2008 could
restore some "macroeconomic stability", it will depress the investment and unemployment
outlook, and it will not create the conditions that Pakistan needs for sustainable long-term
development. We put forward the foundations for a sustainable macroeconomic program for
Pakistan. This contains policy advice that differs markedly from that of the IMF. The essence of
the proposal is the consideration that a government that issues its own currency faces no financial
constraints or solvency risk. This implies that the usual “government budget constraint” has no
economic content. Based on this, we examine the potential role that the country’s fiscal and
monetary policies could play in promoting growth and in generating full employment and price
stability.

Theoretically, we make use of a framework that combines Andrew Baker’s work on social purpose with a novel conception of professional legitimacy, which we divide into internal legitimacy and external legitimacy. Especially when they articulate a strong sense of social purpose and are open to co-constitution, such forms of knowledge can have widespread popular appeal while being vehemently rejected by the economics profession. This means that policymakers must examine not just the potential of alternative expertise per se but also weigh the appeal of the two forms of legitimacy against one another. As a result, this framing can help us understand the complex and sometimes non-linear trade-offs associated with upstart forms of expertise.

Yet, this framing also leaves open crucial questions, that should be addressed by future research on the rise of indie economics. Indeed, as a broader field of ‘lay experts’ emerges, potentially challenging and undermining the more centralised form of knowledge production that has been dominant over the course of the long twentieth century, we will need to grapple with new questions of quality control. Science has always had to contend with tensions between scientific rigour and creativity and has developed mechanisms such as peer review to deal with it. But the changes we now face are altering the nature of this trade-off: co-constitution and the enrolment of lay actors can open new intellectual frontiers and democratise science, but they can also open the floodgates for manipulation, pseudoscience, and misinformation of various forms. Future research should explore the mechanisms of quality control (or lack thereof) that are evolving to navigate this new reality.

To return to Daniela Gabor’s question from the introduction, the rise of MMT shows in no uncertain terms we are in a political climate in which trust in mainstream economic knowledge is desperately frayed and – given this lack of trust – anti-establishment credentials become a crucial source of appeal. The rise of alternative forms of economic expertise is menacing to mainstream macro not just to the extent that it competes with it for finite attention, but also in that it is a symptom of the deeper malaise of the discipline and its failure to prove itself fit for social purpose in the face of interlinking crises.

Today both researchers and policy-makers agree that refugees admitted to the European Union constitute a net cost and fiscal burden for the receiving societies. As is often claimed, there is a trade-off between refugee migration and the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. In this lecture, Peo Hansen shows that this consensual cost-perspective on migration is built on a flawed economic conception of the orthodox “sound finance” doctrine. By shifting perspective to examine migration through the macroeconomic lens offered by Modern Monetary Theory, Hansen is able to demonstrate sound finance’s detrimental impact on migration policy and research. Most importantly, this undertaking offers the tools with which both migration research and migration policy could be modernized and put on a realistic footing. Empirically, the lecture brings these tools to bear on the case of Sweden, the country that, proportionally speaking, has received the most refugees in the EU over the years while also having one of the most comprehensive welfare states in the EU.

Any society must undertake economic activities, which are embedded within social systems, to generate the flow of goods and services to provide for the material means of life, including the provisioning of money. The economic ideology of money as a “neutral” medium of exchange obfuscates the sociopolitical nature of the monetary provisioning system. In contrast, we ground our analysis in the understanding of money as a social relation, and we apply the lens of social provisioning to the monetary system. This view makes clear that the monetary system is embedded within, and reinforces, existing hierarchies and power structures and evolves through processes of political contestation. First, our analysis traces how changes in the monetary system have shaped the institutional structures of early capitalism such that the monetary system was seemingly depoliticized. Second, we apply this historical analysis to generate a deeper understanding of current monetary contestations. We apply a discourse analysis of the European Union’s fiscal rules to reflect these debates. The monetary system as it has taken shape through the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic has brought the political nature of money back into the public imaginary. Accordingly, we highlight the role and power of the state as guarantor of the functioning of the monetary system. A full acknowledgement of this governmental capacity could create renewed space for monetary contestations and democratization. Our analysis reveals that these are both necessary elements to ensure the financing and macroeconomic stability of a social-ecological transformation.

Credit guidance was used extensively in the post-war period. The policy helped states build up their industrial capacity, expand their welfare systems, and accelerate technological innovation in key sectors where rapid development was needed. It is a central pillar of any successful industrial policy framework. And with the ecological crisis, it is gaining renewed attention: A recent report produced by the University College London’s Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose shows how credit guidance can be used to accelerate an effective green transition.

This approach can also be used to offset inflationary pressure. In a scenario where we need to increase public investment in necessary social projects—such as health care, housing, and transit—credit controls can be used to reduce commercial investments elsewhere in the economy (again, specifically in damaging and unnecessary industries that we need to scale down), thus regulating aggregate demand. This is a much more rational strategy for inflation control than using broad-brush interest-rate policy, which can have a devastating impact on people’s livelihoods and on socially important sectors.

Wielding the power of credit, commercial banks get to determine the allocation of investment and therefore determine what gets produced.  They make these decisions based on whatever production is most profitable, regardless of whether it is beneficial or destructive. As a result, we get massive investment in things like fossil fuels, beef and SUVs, because these things are highly profitable to capital, and chronic underinvestment in necessary sectors like renewable energy, regenerative agriculture and public transit, because these are less profitable or not profitable at all.  

This dynamic is what explains the fact that high-income countries – like the United States and Britain – are characterized by extremely high levels of resource use and yet still fail to meet many basic human needs. It is because investment is controlled in an undemocratic way, and is totally unaccountable to society.

Credit guidance can help deal with this problem.  We need a democratically ratified framework to guide private investment in line with social and ecological objectives rather than just profit maximization. What are our main goals and values as a society? What do we need to accomplish? What forms of production should be increased in order to improve human well-being?  What forms of production are destructive and unnecessary and should be scaled down?  These questions should be democratically determined and a credit guidance framework should be established accordingly.