In the US, housing policy distinctively subsidizes homeownership. Most notably in the form of the Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction, federal policy benefits owners much more than tenants. Climate policy is no different. In public or cooperative housing models, the government or cooperative serves as the landlord or property manager, and therefore has more direct influence over the fate of property conditions. In much of the private market, by contrast—which is where the vast majority of tenants find housing—the federal government sees its role as less direct. Tenants in many multifamily properties have no direct method of contracting for services; many do not know who owns the real estate. The IRA’s focus on incentives and credits for landlords maintains this property relationship.
The fact that about one in three housing units are occupied by tenants raises questions about the effects such climate tax incentives will have on owners of rental property. The Biden Administration has emphasized the importance of channeling these funds to “disadvantaged communities,” maintaining that about 40 percent of funds should go toward low-income households, 10 percent of which should go toward multi-family households. However, the facts of ownership leave open a stubborn question: will landlord spending on climate retrofits—a condition for receiving public funds—alter existing financial terms between tenants and landlords?
In Phenomenal World
Recent coverage of insurance markets has highlighted the industry’s involvement in the so-called “climate risk doom loop”: looming climate risks and worse disasters are raising the price of insurance for real estate and infrastructure assets, exacerbating their owners’ vulnerability to future disasters and feeding into higher insurance prices in the future―or the withdrawal of insurance coverage altogether.
Rising insurance prices and the credible threat of insurer divestment from higher-risk areas will constrain investment in both homes and businesses across vulnerable communities. Yet more people are moving into higher-risk areas, and some politicians fear backlash if they let insurance companies deny these communities coverage. In response, state leaders in California and Florida have sought to prevent divestment by directing their insurance commissioners to adjust pricing regulations, invite competition in insurance markets, or derisk insurers by imposing disaster-risk fees on all insurance purchasers regardless of risk.
Private investors, meanwhile, believe the insurance industry should follow price signals: if firms can identify the climate risks an assets could face, and investors price those risks into building and maintaining costs, then market actors will invest prudently.
I argue that insurance is a woefully inadequate financial tool for coping with the impacts of climate change. Improving insurance markets does little to address the fact that the core drivers of the “climate risk doom loop” rest in the design of capital markets, which are structured to direct investment away from vulnerable communities when they most need it.