Linkage

Giant White Houses are white, with jet-black accents: the shutters, the gutters, the rooves. They are giant—Hulk houses—swollen to the very limits of the legally allowed property setback, and unnaturally tall. They feature a mishmash of architectural features, combining, say, the peaked roof of a farmhouse with squared-off sections reminiscent of city townhomes. They mix horizontal siding, vertical paneling, and painted brick willy-nilly.

Like the giant White House just down the road from us in Washington, D.C., the Giant White House may be occupied by a Republican or a Democrat, but whoever they are, they are rich. Once the house next door was finished, it went on the market for $2.5 million. The house has five bedrooms and six baths and is 5,600 square feet.

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Kate Wagner of McMansion Hell argued that this architectural incoherence stems, in fact, from the modern homebuyer’s saturation in Zillow and Redfin. “Design magazines, HGTV, even Instagram—those are really media empires of the past,” she said. “Overwhelmingly, by sheer monthly users, the way people interact with architecture now is through real estate listings. We’re always Zillow browsing.”

And what do you see on Zillow? If you’re one of the lucky Americans who can afford to buy your first home, and you want to live in a neighborhood like our part of Arlington, you may find that the “starter house,” as you once knew it, is awfully hard to find. Because land is worth so much and old houses, comparatively, are worth so little, when families sell small houses here, they sell them to developers, not to other families. And those developers, driven by fear and money, knock the small houses down to build GWHs. The more GWHs they build, the more the neighborhood is made up of GWHs. The more you scan Zillow, the more it starts to make sense: Like nearly a million Americans a year, you’re better off just buying a brand-new house, too.

After all, in an era when a home purchase is likely the most secure, lucrative investment you will ever make, a house really no longer is a house. It is no longer simply the place where you live. It is your future in building form. It is the way you’ll pay for college, the way you might afford retirement. “I don’t think we think of the dream home anymore,” Wagner said. “We now see houses primarily as vehicles for investment. The best way to do that is if everything looks the same.”

Peter is co-host of the If Books Could Kill podcast, which I highly recommend.

 The percentage of Republican men who believe that women should return to their traditional roles in society has jumped from 28 to 48%. Among Republican women, the increase is from 23 to 37%. This has happened in the span of two years. As alarming as this is, it’s important to ask yourself: what do you think happened here? Do you think that Republican voters, organically and of their own volition, drastically shifted their fundamental perceptions of women’s role in society? Of course not. They are being influenced by messaging from conservative elites, who themselves are radicalizing on issues of race and gender.

This dynamic is often obvious. YouGov polling shows Republican support for higher tariffs at 51%, with just 5% supporting lower tariffs. A year ago those numbers were 38 and 20%, respectively. Again, what happened? Did they all read the same economics textbook? Or did they follow the lead of Donald Trump, who made higher tariffs a central campaign issue?

Democrats tend to miss this. When Kamala Harris lost, several prominent Democrats said the party had strayed too far from the public on trans issues. Gavin Newsom, speaking on his new podcast to his guest Charlie Kirk (Jesus Christ) repeated the talking point just this week. But just a few years ago the savvy political wisdom was that Republican anti-trans efforts had overstepped, alienating voters. Republicans, though, weren’t cowed by public opinion. Rather than retreat, they went on the offensive, seeking to reshape the public debate. And they did, leveraging inflection points like women’s sports to galvanize their base and push liberals into a defensive posture.

If you’re a political party, your goal is not just to know where voters stand, but to know how to move them. Instead, Democratic operatives seem content to reduce their platform to a focus-grouped ephemera, drifting whichever way the political winds blow it. 

I don't know about this. Treating people with respect ought not depend on identifying some anatomical feature. Situating that feature in the brain does not make it any better.

For those who question the slogan “Trans Women are Women,” the science provides a compelling answer. Gender identity is deeply rooted in brain development, and transgender women have been shown to possess brain structures that align more closely with cisgender women than cisgender men. The term “woman” is not just about chromosomes or reproductive capacity; it is a social and neurological identity shaped by a complex interplay of biology, psychology, and lived experience.

When TERFs or gender-critical individuals ask, “What is a woman?” the most accurate response is, “A woman is someone who identifies and experiences themselves as a woman, and this identity is supported by both social and biological science. Brain studies show that transgender women have neurological patterns that differ from cisgender men and align more closely with cisgender women. To reduce womanhood to mere reproductive function ignores the complexity of human identity and the science behind gender.”

The conversation didn’t stop there. Charlie Kirk quickly pivoted to other transgender issues, bringing up Vice President Kamala Harris’ support for incarcerated transgender people. Newsom agreed that the Kamala is for they/them ads were politically damaging, calling them "devastating." When asked about transgender incarcerated people, Newsom responded, "This was even more challenging… because this is issues of people who are incarcerated getting taxpayer-funded gender reassignment… that is a 90/10 [issue]," referring to how he believes such policies poll. He also appeared frustrated that Harris "was in the video and expressed support."

At the close of the podcast, Charlie Kirk shifted the discussion to transgender healthcare, stating, "I encourage you to learn about the butchery that is happening under chemical castration in this state. The American people are overwhelmingly against it." Newsom responded, "Yeah. I think we have to be more sensitized to that."

Kirk continued, "Youth should be off limits, you might be right on deportations, I know I’m right on this," to which Newsom simply acknowledged, "Yeah." Kirk then cited the Cass Report—a widely criticized and legally discredited review used to justify bans on transgender healthcare in the UK—as evidence that gender-affirming care for youth should be prohibited. Newsom offered no pushback, replying, "I’m not an expert on this, but I appreciate your broader [point]."

Newsom’s invitation and capitulation to Charlie Kirk on his podcast will alarm LGBTQ+ advocates. Kirk has a well-documented history of extremist rhetoric and hostility toward the LGBTQ+ community. In a 2023 video, he stated, “These people are sick… I blame the decline of American men. Someone should have just ‘took care of it’ the way we used to take care of things in the 1950s and 60s, but as you have testosterone rates going down and men acting like women, well…”—seemingly advocating for violence against transgender people. Kirk has also repeatedly used the slur "tr*nny" and has encouraged its normalization. He once called transgender people “a throbbing middle finger to god.” In the last election cycle, TPUSA’s PAC, which he leads, spent millions on anti-transgender ads, making his presence on Newsom’s platform all the more striking.

This is a brilliant explainer. Here's the punchline:

Industrial policy was once central to the rise of today’s wealthiest nations. Yet, after achieving their own development, many downplayed the state’s role, promoting free-market rules abroad. The climate crisis forces a re-evaluation of that legacy. China offers a striking example of what strategic planning can achieve. Long before emerging as a global leader in green technologies, it used industrial policy to build manufacturing capacity, infrastructure and innovation. Through the coordinated efforts of state-owned enterprises, long-term planning, public procurement and technology transfer, China now leads global production of solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles. These interventions have helped drive down global costs, making renewables more accessible and helping to accelerate the energy transition worldwide.

This kind of coordination cannot be replicated by merely relying on market inducements like carbon pricing. When climate action is framed primarily as a problem of mobilising finance, the role of the state is reduced to simply enabling private investment rather than leading the transformation. Public institutions are cast not as planners or investors but as guarantors, tasked with making green investments more attractive to private actors. Tools like blended finance and public-private partnerships are promoted as solutions, but their logic reinforces the idea that structural change must be routed through private investors’ incentives. In practice, this limits the scope of public ambition and steers policy toward projects with clear financial returns rather than broader social or ecological value.

Market mechanisms may help reduce emissions at the margins, and may generate some revenue, but they are not designed to coordinate across sectors, manage trade-offs, or drive large-scale transitions. Treating finance as the central constraint sidelines the essential questions of what gets built, by whom and in whose interest. The belief that markets alone can deliver the necessary scale and direction has not only delayed progress but also distorted priorities—placing finance at the centre while allowing questions of production, capacity, and coordination to fade into the background.

As the United States retreats from managing the international order, returning under Trump to a more transactional and coercive approach to foreign policy—ditching the Paris Agreement, undermining multilateralism, and waging tariff wars under the banner of economic nationalism—it also exposes the fragility of the existing system. The version of globalization built on US financial dominance, free capital flows and market liberalization is beginning to crack under the weight of its own contradictions.

If this chaos has an upside, it is that it presents an opportunity to build an alternative—and radically more just—financial architecture, and to confront the economic orthodoxies that needlessly constrain what is considered possible.

A grounding in the queer history of the legal system in the United Kingdom reveals striking parallels between the moral panic leading to the enactment of Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, and the current moment’s discourse surrounding the inclusion of transgender people in social spaces and their potential right to self-identification of gender in law. Through use of moral panic theory, this article examines and contextualizes the historical forces at play in the formation of laws around queer and trans lives in the UK, and in particular the instrumentalization of fears over the safety of children and cisgender women. The article also provides a practical example of the influence of the trans moral panic on law reform, by evaluating the debate surrounding the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill 2022. It concludes that there is no ‘gender crisis’ in the UK, but there are powerful social forces at work to stoke a moral panic and, in doing so, stigmatize and alienate trans people in a similar manner to the stigmatization of homosexuality as an illegitimate way of life under Section 28.

For more than two decades, I’ve been what some might call a hoarder but what I’ve more affectionately dubbed a “digital packrat.” Which is to say I mostly avoid streaming services, I don’t trust any company or cloud with my digital media, and I store everything as files on devices that I physically control. My mp3 collection has been going strong since the Limewire days, I keep high-quality rips of all my movies on a local media server, and my preferred reading device holds a large collection of DRM-free ebooks and PDFs—everything from esoteric philosophy texts and scientific journals to scans of lesbian lifestyle magazines from the 1980s.

Sure, there are websites where you can find some of this material, like the Internet Archive. But this archive is mine. It’s my own little Library of Alexandria, built from external hard drives, OCD, and a strong distrust of corporations. I know I’m not the only one who has gone to these lengths. Sometimes when I’m feeling gloomy, I imagine how when society falls apart, we packrats will be the only ones in our village with all six seasons of The Sopranos. At the rate we’re going, that might not be too far off.

Amazon is far from alone in this long-running trend towards eliminating digital ownership. For many people, digital distribution and streaming services have already practically ended the concept of owning and controlling your own media files. Spotify is now almost synonymous with music for some younger generations, having strip-mined the music industry from both ends by demonetizing more than 60% of the artists on its platform and pushing algorithmic slop while­ simultaneously raising subscription fees.

Of course, surrendering this control means being at the complete mercy of Amazon and other platforms to determine what we can watch, read, and listen to—and we’ve already seen that these services frequently remove content for all sorts of reasons. Last October, one year after the Israeli military began its campaign of genocide in Gaza, Netflix removed “Palestinian Stories,” a collection of 19 films featuring Palestinian filmmakers and characters, saying it declined to renew its distribution license. Amazon also once famously deleted copies of 1984 off of people’s Kindles. Fearing piracy, many software companies have moved from the days of “Don’t Copy That Floppy” to the cloud-based software-as-a-service model, which requires an internet connection and charges users monthly subscription fees to use apps like Photoshop. No matter how you look at it, digital platforms have put us on a path to losing control of any media that we can’t physically touch.

Standing ovation for chx:

Karoly Negyesi: Well, even framing this as "AI" is misleading. The entire field is essentially based on a short paper written by John von Neumann in the 1950s. In that paper, he declared—without a single shred of proof, and yet people readily believed it—that the human brain is obviously digital. People have believed this so strongly that even today, neuroscientists struggle to describe how the brain works without using digital metaphors. But the truth is, the human brain does not work like a computer.

So, calling these statistical pattern-matching systems "artificial intelligence" is just misleading. 'Retrieve a memory', your brain doesn’t retrieve a memory. It’s not a computer. It never was. Everybody knows this. You never retrieve a memory the way a computer does. You do not store your memories as a computer does. That whole concept is just not true.  

There was a brilliant book about this a couple of years back that described how, in different eras, people compared the brain to whatever technology was available to them. Descartes compared it to a machine. Von Neumann compared it to a digital computer. None of that is true. Of course, we still don’t quite know how the brain actually works. So then we pursue something called artificial intelligence, and by that, we mean something that matches this completely misplaced and untrue metaphor of the brain.  

The whole premise of artificial intelligence is broken. It’s just not true. You are building a castle on quicksand. There’s nothing there. And beyond this, there’s just so much wrong with it. Almost blindly trusting whatever a large language model spits back at you—because, once again, I don’t think people fully understand or even partially understand what they are getting.  

So, no, I don’t think AI is progressing in the way people think it is. I mean, obviously, there’s some progress, but it is not going where people think it can go.  It’s never going to match a human brain—at least not this way.  And quite likely, not within our lifetimes. Probably not even within a few centuries. We will not have a machine that is capable of doing what the human brain is capable of. Mostly because—we still have no clue how the brain actually works. 

Trump is not a political anomaly. He's not a disruptive force that came out of nowhere. And contrary to the column inches of pearl-clutching pundits, he didn't hijack the Republican Party - he unmasked it. His presidency is the product of decades of strategy, ideology, and deliberately nurtured, festering decay.

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Republican voters bear direct responsibility. They are active participants in America’s political apocalypse, not passive victims manipulated against their interests. After witnessing years of his break-it-without-buying-it governance and hearing his promises of harm, the Americans who voted for Trump in 2024 weren't deceived. They were convinced. They didn't hold their noses while voting for mass deportations and stripping transgender people of their civil rights. They huffed the scent and loved it.

Blaming Trump alone offers psychological comfort, by localizing a systemic problem in a single figurehead. It legitimizes the false promise that removing one man solves the underlying condition. It absolves millions of their responsibility while leaving intact the machinery that produced Trump - and will create future authoritarian leaders.

Political scientist Cas Mudde has suggested a classification I find particularly helpful, especially when it comes to determining what, exactly, we are confronted with in case of the AfD. Mudde has been at the forefront of the research on far-right parties and movement across Europe – few people can offer the kind of broad, comparative perspective he can provide. In his 2019 book The Far Right Today, Mudde concisely outlines what I believe is an extremely useful typology.

The first key distinction to draw is between the mainstream right and the far right. On the mainstream right, we find established conservative parties that are largely on board with the foundations of liberal democracy: the rule of law, universal suffrage, free and fair elections, minority rights, protection of baseline civil liberties. What defines them as parties of the right is that they are skeptical towards the idea of egalitarianism; they accept “natural” hierarchies which they contend should either be preserved or, at least, not leveled via state intervention. But they tolerate some measure of pluralism, respect democratic deliberation, and ultimately support and stabilize the democratic system.

Far-right movements and parties, by contrast, reject the system – they are fundamentally not on board with liberal democracy. Crucially, the far right is itself not a monolithic bloc but covers a range of ideologies as well as attitudes and dispositions. Cas Mudde helpfully distinguishes two main camps on the far right: the radical right and the extreme right. The distinction really comes down to a reactionary (on the radical right) vs revolutionary (on the extreme right) attitude and political project. The radical-right reactionaries disdain liberal democracy, but prefer to work mostly within the existing political and constitutional system to turn the clock back; they begrudgingly accept some level of restraint in their anti-democratic pursuit. If they got their way, they would probably erect something that is best described as an illiberal democracy: It still looks democratic on the surface, with elections and opposition parties, but the system is set up to entrench certain hierarchies, discriminate against historically marginalized groups, and consolidate power in the hands of the right. To me, Chief Justice John Roberts belongs in that bucket (and has a case to be one of their standard-bearers in the United States).

The extreme-right revolutionaries, on the other hand, will never be satisfied with just reformist reactionary measures. They desire to tear the system down. They accept no opposition, no restraint. They are not content to bend the law, they believe they stand above it. They don’t just want to make it harder for certain groups to participate in the political process, they want to purge them from the nation.