A little more than a week into the U.S.’s campaign against the Iranian regime—which the Pentagon classifies as a below peer level—Central Command is pulling interceptors from the Indo-Pacific to keep the defensive umbrella intact over the Persian Gulf.
How is this possible when every major strategy document of the 21st century promised that the United States military could handle what lay ahead?
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which replaced the Cold War two-war framework, pledged to “swiftly defeat” aggression in two theaters while winning decisively in one. The 2018 National Defense Strategy shifted the frame to Great Power competition, assuring Congress that the joint force could mount sufficient deterrence in three regions, fight and win one major conflict, and maintain the ability to deter a second. The 2022 National Defense Strategy introduced “integrated deterrence,” which described a force that could simultaneously address the “pacing threat” of China, the “acute threat” of Russia, and persistent challenges in the Middle East.


